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A New Look At The European Patent:
Limited Availability
Harold G. Maier*
The question of whether or not nationals of non-EEC states should
be permitted to acquire patents under the proposed European Patent
Convention has been the subject of much legal commentary. In this
article, Professor Maier re-examines the problem with emphasis on the
interests of the EEC in developing a true Common Market Patent
Law. Pointing out that it is in the long-range interests of the EEC to
make the new patent freely available to nationals of other states, the
author concludes that the United States should nevertheless support the
adoption of a Community patent of initially limited availability as a
means of encouraging the economic integration of the Common Market.
The promulgation of the Proposed Draft Convention relating to
a European Patent Law in December 1962,' by the member states
of the European Economic Community, and the continuing contro-
versy surrounding it since that time have raised important questions
for European and American businessmen. One of the most contro-
versial is the extent to which the new patent should be made "avail-
able"2 to nationals of states not parties to the proposed Convention.
This article examines the question of "availability" from the standpoint
of the interests of the EEC and its member states. Its objective is
to demonstrate that although the legal arguments in favor of un-
limited availability are strong, the primary consideration for the
member states and for others interested in the Community's success
should be the present need of the EEC for an agreement on a true
Common Market Patent law.
*Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. At least three unofficial texts of the EPC have been published in English:
Draft Convention Relating to a European Patent Law, Her Majesty's Stationary Office
(London, 1963); Translation of a Draft Convention relating to a European Patent Law,
45 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 182 (1963); 2 CCH Com. MKT. REP. ir 5503-724; (the last two
citations are authorized reprints of the first).
2. Use of the term "available" in place of the term "accessible" in this context was
first suggested by David Ladd, former United States Patent Commissioner, to dis-
tinguish between the rights of nationals of non-contracting states to apply for patent
protection under the new patent and the rights of other states to accede to the Con-
vention. See Ladd, The Industrial Property Revolution in the Common Market and the
United States, 1963 Im. PROP. 124. Compare Minutes of the Presidents' Conference
on the Study of the Draft Proposal for the European Patent, Berlin Congress of A.I.P.P.I.,
ECBUSA-821, USEC Brussels, p. 1, where the term "accessibility" is used in this
connection.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
The abolition of artificial barriers to interstate trade is a basic
objective of the Treaty of Rome3 creating the Community. Although
the treaty took steps to remove tariffs, encourage competition and free
the movement of labor and capital within the Community, it did not
formulate a method for eliminating trade barriers created by the
patent laws of the member states.
A patent right is territorial in character. It represents an exclusive
right granted by a sovereign for the manufacture, use, or sale of a
product or process embodying an inventive idea. It is the power
of the sovereign which makes the right exclusive and where the
power to enforce that exclusivity ceases, the patent right ceases as well.
The granting of patent rights is, therefore, a direct function of terri-
torial sovereignty. It is by sovereign authority that the patentee has
the right to prevent, or to exact payment for, the importation of
articles subject to his exclusive rights into the territory in which his
sovereign's power is effective.
The proposed European Patent Convention (hereinafter EPC) is
aimed at limiting and eventually eliminating as a barrier to trade
within the Common Market the effects of the territorial exercise of
patent rights.
Because the framers of the EPC were fully aware that the im-
mediate abolition of national patent rights was neither practically
nor politically possible, the initial report by Dr. Kurt Haerte 4 on
the feasibility of establishing a European patent recommended the
creation of a completely autonomous patent to co-exist with patents
granted under the laws of the national states.5 The effectiveness of
the scheme depended on one basic assumption-that once the existence
of a European patent was established and patent rights fully pro-
tected thereunder, the national patent laws would fall into disuse
and finally disappear. In addition, the Convention was conceived
as providing a "driving force" toward unification in other legal
areas which would "contribute to the creation of legal systems
corresponding to the economic and political necessities of the com-
munity.. . ."6 It is a basic disagreement concerning these economic
3. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, signed March 25, 1957,
by France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Federal Republic
of Germany. Reprinted in 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958).
4. For an outline of the preliminary work on the proposed Convention and a dis-
cussion of prior European attempts to unify industrial property law, see Ulmer,
Europdisches Patentrecht im Werden, 1962 GEwEcBLicHER REcTSSCHUTZ UND URnE-
nERnREcrr, ausl. Tefl. 531 [hereinafter cited as GRUR]; Robbins, The Proposed New
European Patent, 5 PTC J. REs. & ED. 217 (1962).
5. See Ulmer, supra note 4, at 540.
6. Froschmaier, The Draft Convention on Patents in the Common Market, in
RESTRICTrVE PRACTICES, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION IN TIl
CommoN MARKET 50-59 (INT. & CoMP. L.Q. Supp. Publ. No. 4, 1962).
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and political necessities which has slowed the progress of the Com-
munity during the past three years and prevented a final agreement
on the terms of the proposed patent convention itself.
7
I. THE PROBLEM OF ACCESSION BY OTHER STATES
Dr. Haertel, speaking before the German Society for Comparative
Law in September 1965, set forth the following alternative approaches
to the problem of establishing a multinational patent law: (1) the
creation of a true EEC patent controlled by the EEC member states
with participation open to non-members, or (2) the creation of an
international patent, based on a general agreement between many
participating states in which all would have equal rights. The second
alternative would amount to the creation of a "package patent"
(Biindel-Patent) based on separate rights under the national laws
of the participating states. This latter approach would require an
additional agreement within the EEC on a single patent for that
organization if the original purpose of the present draft were to be
accomplished.8
The original draft of the EPC did not set forth the second alter-
native but it did envision an "open-end" convention accessible to
states other than those presently constituting the EEC.
Article 5 of the Draft Convention contains two variants:
ARTICLE 5-PERSONs ENTITLED TO APPLY FOR EUROPEAN PATENTS.
1st Variant
Any person desiring to obtain protection for his invention
for the whole of the territory of the Contracting States, may
apply for a European Patent.
2nd Variant
(1) Any natural or legal person or any body equivalent
by virtue of national law, to a legal person, possessing the
nationality of one of the Contracting States, who desires to
obtain protection for his invention for the whole of the ter-
ritory of the Contracting States, may apply for a European
Patent.
(2) The application for a European patent must be based
on one or more applications for a national patent filed in one
of the Contracting States and constituting first filings within
the meaning of Article 4 of the Paris Convention for the
7. See Common Market Members Compromise Their Differences, 2 CCH CoM. MxrT.
REP. II 9084.
8. Address by Dr. Kurt Haertel, Die Bemiihungen urn eine Patentrechtsverein-
heitlichung im Rahmen der Europliischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, speech before the
Convention of the Comparative Law Society, Kiel, Germany, Sept. 10, 1965. This speech
is scheduled for future publication in GRUR.
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Protection of Industrial Property of 20th March, 1883, last
revised at Lisbon on 31st October, 1958.
Neither of these variants implies the creation of a truly "international
patent." Paragraph (1) of variant 2 indicates the "open-end" nature
of the convention by making the patent available to a national of
any "contracting state," but article 211 imposes additional restrictions
which are not compatible with the usual multilateral convention
agreement.
ARTICLE 211-AccEssoN.
(1) Any state which is a party to the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property may apply to accede to
this Convention. It shall address its application to the [Ad-
ministrative Council] whose decision must be unanimous.
(2) The terms of admission and, as far as necessary, the
adaptations of this Convention called for by that admission,
shall be the subject of a special agreement between the Con-
tracting States and the State requesting admission. This special
agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all Contracting
States in conformity with their respective constitutional practice.
(3) Preparatory work for drawing up the special agreement
shall be in the hands of the [Administrative Council].
The requirement of unanimity in article 211(1) together with the
requirement of a special agreement in article 211(2) place the Draft
Convention outside the realm of the broader international patent con-
vention to which Haertel referred. Article 211 presumes an initially
limited group of contracting states which would admit others on a
piecemeal basis at their own discretion. In addition, a note appended
to article 211 indicates that a minority of the framers would prefer
that accession be entirely restricted to European countries. By their
terms and implication both article 5 and article 211 are based on the
assumption that membership in the new patent convention would not
be restricted to EEC member-states. Article 212 provides for "as-
sociation" rather than accession but on essentially the same terms
as article 211. 9
Haertel, however, indicated a preference for creating a patent for
the benefit of the EEC as such,10 and, despite its "open-end" nature,
9. 2 CCH CoM. Mx-r. REP. 1f 5721.
ARTICLE 212. AssocrATioN
(1) Any State which is a party to the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property may apply to be associated with this Convention by virtue of
a special agreement concluded with the Contracting States and involving reciprocal
rights and obligations. I shall address its application to the [Administrative
Council], whose decision shall be unanimous.
(2) Preparatory work for drawing up the special agreement shall be the
responsibility of the [Administrative Council].
10. Haertel, supra note 8.
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this same preference for a patent which will primarily serve Com-
munity purposes is an integral part of the structure of the Draft Con-
vention itself.
II. RELAnONSHIP OF T=E EPC TO TIB EEC
It has already been pointed out that the concept of a European
patent is intimately related to the projected economic (and, even-
tually, perhaps, political) union between the six EEC member
states. The Convention was seen as an alternative to an immediate
attempt to harmonize patent laws under article 100 of the Rome
Treaty.' The proposal to make the Convention patent available to
all patentees of whatever nationality has been justified in terms of the
needs of the Community.12 Conversely, the attempt to limit the
availability of the patent to nationals of contracting states and the
right of accession to European nations has been justified as a means
of preventing external competition (generally, from United States'
enterprises) from dominating the economic development of the Com-
mon Market.'
3
On the other hand, there is no express basis for the promulgation
of the Convention in the Rome Treaty itself. Industrial property as
such is mentioned only twice in the Rome document: once in article
106 and annex 3, which provide, together, for the unrestricted transfer
of fees under industrial property licenses, and once in article 36
which specifically recognizes a state's right to protect industrial
property as an exception to the general prohibition against quantita-
tive restrictions on the interstate movement of goods.' 4 Even the
Commission's action in recommending investigation into the feasibility
of a European patent is not completely within the scope of its tech-
nical function.15
11. Froschmaier, supra note 6, at 59; Meller, Towards a Multinational Patent System,
44 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 227, 247 (1962); see Memorandum of the Commission of the
European Economic Community on the Action Programme for the Second Stage,
issued at Brussels, October 24, 1962, reprinted in International Legal Materials,
Current Documents, Vol. II, No. 1, Jan. 1963, p. 251.
12. See Behrman, The Convention for European Industrial Property Rights, 5 PTc.
f. RES. & ED. 233, 245 (1961); Froschmaier, Patents, Trademarks and Licenses Within
the Community in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF TnE EURoPEAN ECONOMIC CoMMUNrrY AND
1961); Weiser, Patent and Antitrust Developments and Prospects of the European
Economic Community, 8 PTC J. Rs. & ED. 1, 19 (1964), quoting Dr. Eberhardt
Giinther, President of the German Federal Cartel Office.
13. Armengaud, Political Aspects of Accessibility to the European Patent, 7 PTC
J. REs. & ED. 314, 317 (1963); Meller, supra note 11, at 244; Study Regarding
International Cooperation in the Patents Field, 5 IND. PRoP. Q. 45-46 (1960).
14. See Verloren van Themaat, Die Beduetung von Art. 36 fiir die kartellrechtliche
Beurteilung von Patentlizenzvertrdgen nach Art. 85. des EWC-Vertrages, 1964
GRUB, ausl. Teil 21.
15. See Bobbins, supra note 4, at 220.
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The EPC contains no suggestion that accession to it should be
limited exclusively to the six EEC countries. Although articles 211 and
212 correspond in their terms to the provisions for accession and as-
sociation in the Treaty of Rome,16 there is no requirement that
accession or association under the Convention be contingent upon
membership in or association with the Community.
This apparent legal separation of the Community from the Con-
vention is illusory at best. The entire structure of the Convention
rests on an assumption of a degree of economic and political integra-
tion between participating states which can only be found among
the six members of the EEC. Article 20(a) provides for the exhaus-
tion of patent rights in all contracting states "after the proprietor of
the patent has put that article on the market in one of these States."' 7
Article 29(2) provides for free importation of once-marketed patented
products without regard to licensing restrictions. Article 142 pro-
vides for compulsory licensing in "the entire territories of all the
Contracting States." Article 138 directly refers to and incorporates
article 17 through 23 of the Euratom Treaty (relating to compulsory
patent licensing). Articles 197, 198 and 200 impose restrictions on
rights held under national patents in the "Contracting States." Even
the provisions for financial contributions 8 and for establishing official
languages19 are couched in Treaty of Rome terms.20 Also, it has been
suggested that the judicial function under the Convention be placed
in the Court of the European Communities at Luxembourg.21
In short, any state which acceded to the Convention in its present
form would submit itself to policies designed primarily for imple-
menting the political and economic integration of the EEC without
receiving the additional economic benefits which the Treaty of Rome
provides. Therefore, even if variant 1 of article 211 were adopted
and a form of accession or association could be found which was not
politically or legally unacceptable domestically, a non-EEC state
desiring to accede to the EPC would be faced with significant practical
difficulties. If accession were permitted on less stringent terms than
those required for accession or association with the EEC, it seems
16. Compare Treaty of Rome, arts. 237, 2438, 298 U.N.T.S. 92.
17. The second variant of article 20(a) does not make this provision.
18. Article 42 (3), 1st variant. The second variant suggests the scale in Article 13(3)
of the Revised Convention of the Hague concerning the creation of an International
Patents Institute.
19. Article 217 gives the official languages of the EPC as French, Dutch, German
and Italian.
20. For a more complete discussion of the relationship between the EPC and the
EEC see Davidson, The Bond Between the Convention Relating to a European
Patent Law and the Rome Treaty, 1963 IND. PNoP. 155.
21. Froschmaier, Some Aspects of the Draft Convention Relating to a European
Patent Law, 12 Lhr. & ComT. L.Q. 886, 896 (1963).
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likely that the primary function of the new patent to contribute to
the development of the Community might be seriously hampered,
especially if the accession agreement contained compromise measures
not fully consonant with the efficient operation of the new patent
within the Common Market. On the other hand, if accessibility to the
new Convention were limited to EEC states, the adoption of the
restrictive variant of article 5 would raise real difficulties for outsiders.
Since that variant would prohibit granting a Convention Patent to
anyone not a national of a contracting state, all nationals of non-EEC
states would be denied protection under the new patent rights unless
they could establish themselves as nationals of an EEC member
state.22
Even with the "open-end" nature of the presently proposed Conven-
tion, the proposal of restricted availability gave rise to a flood of
legal commentary attacking variant 2 of article 5 as a violation of
the Paris Union Convention of Industrial Property of 188 3.P The
following detailed analysis of the relationship between a European
patent law and the legal obligations of the EEC member states as
parties to multilateral and bilateral international agreements demon-
strates that legal objections to limiting the availability of a true EEC
patent are much less compelling than where an "openend" multilateral
convention is contemplated.
III. THiE EPC AND = PAAs UNION
Two articles of the Paris Union agreement are relevant to the
international legal status of the proposed EPC:
ARTICLE 2
(1) Nationals of each of the countries of the Union shall, as regards
the protection of industrial property, enjoy in all other countries of the
Union advantages that their respective laws now grant or may hereafter
grant, to their own nationals, without prejudice to the rights especially
provided by the present Convention. Consequently, they shall have the
same protection as the latter, and the same legal remedy against any
22. There is a possibility that either section (1) or section (2) of variant 2 could be
adopted without the other. Section (1) alone would probably allow filing by a
Common Market subsidiary of a foreign company. Section (2) alone would allow
anyone to file as long as his filing constituted a "first filing" under Article 4 of the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883. Sections (1) and
(2) together would require not only nationality but also "first filing," a requirement
which could not be met if the subject of the proposed patent were a product or
process previously patented in a third country. See Weiser, The European Common
Market Patent Convention: The Right to Apply for a Common Market Patent, 6 PTC
J. REs. & ED. 317, 319-20 (1963).
23. 25 Stat. 1372, T.S. No. 379; revised at Brussels, Dec. 14, 1900, 32 Stat. 1936,
T.S. No. 411; at Washington, June 2, 1911, 38 Stat. 1645, T.S. No. 579; at the Hagne,
Nov. 6, 1925, 47 Stat. 1789, T.S. No. 834; at London, June 2, 1934, 53 Stat. 1748, T.S.
No. 941; and at Lisbon, Oct. 31, 1958 [1962] 1 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 4931.
All further references are to the Lisbon revision, unless otherwise indicated.
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infringement of their rights, provided they observe the conditions and
formalities imposed upon nationals.
(2) However, no condition as to possession of a domicile or establish-
ment in the country where protection is claimed may be required of
persons entitled to the benefits of the Union for the enjoyment of in-
dustrial property rights.
ARTICLE 15
It is understood that the countries of the Union reserve the right to
make separately between themselves special arrangements for the pro-
tection of industrial property, in so far as these arrangements do not
contravene the provisions of the present Convention.
These articles raise two legal issues: Would the adoption of variant
2 of article 5, EPC, violate the "national treatment principle" of article
2 of the Paris Convention? Would the proposed EPC qualify as a
"special arrangement" under article 15 of the Paris agreement?
Answers to these questions require a consideration of the relation-
ship of the EPC provisions to the national patent laws of the con-
tracting states.
The national patent laws of the six members of the EEC differ
substantially in many respects. Two different methods for deter-
mining patentability exist. Germany and the Netherlands have a
strict examination system for novelty and patentability including a
patent search, much like that in the United States. France, Belgium,
Luxembourg, and Italy have a "registration" procedure under which
a patent is granted upon application and its validity determined only
if it is later challenged in court. The duration of patent protection
varies with each national law. Some countries exclude certain types of
products or processes from patent protection altogether while others
grant patents on those same products or processes. Since six different
patent offices and court systems are involved, standards of inventive-
ness vary from one country to another. Significant variations are found
in the requirements for payment of fees and in working requirements
to prevent compulsory licensing.24
The EPC, on the other hand, contains its own provisions relating
to many of these areas. Articles 76 through 87 provide for the initial
grant of a "provisional patent" after an abbreviated search to de-
termine novelty and patentability. Articles 88 through 104 provide
for the issuance of a "final patent" within a period of five years
24. See generally Neumeyer, Compulsory Licensing of Patents Under Some Non-
American Systems, Study of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copy-
rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., #19
(1958); Goldsmith, Patent Protection for United States Inventions in the Principal
European Countries-Existing Systems, 6 B.C. IND. AND COMm. L. Rlv. 533 (1965);
Neumeyer, Unification of European Patent Legislation on the Common Market, 24 MoD.
L. REv. 725 (1961); Ulmer, The Availability of European Patents and the Paris Con-
vention, 1963 IND. PROP. 51.
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following publication of the grant of the provisional patent after a
more thorough search and investigation procedure. Articles 9 through
14 set forth defmitions of patentability. Whether or not these defini-
tions are met is to be determined by a European Patent Office.2
5
Article 20 (1st variant) defines various infringing acts and allows an
action for contributory infringement.26 Although article 174 places
suits for patent infringement in national courts, article 181 empowers
a European Patent Court to issue declaratory judgments on the
issue of infringement which would bind national tribunals. A judicial
determination of the validity of a patent-that is, patentability-is, on
the other hand, reserved to a European Patent Court.27 This, in
effect, eliminates the defense in a national court that a patent is
invalid and therefore not infringed.2
This brief comparison of the national patent laws and the pro-
posed Convention makes it clear that if the right to obtain a European
patent is limited to nationals of contracting states, those nationals
will be given different substantive rights under the EPC than are
available to nationals of other Paris Union states which have not
acceded to the EPC. This difference could not be avoided even if
an attempt were made to "harmonize" the patent laws of the indi-
vidual contracting states of the EPC because variations in in-
terpretation would inevitably arise with six or more national courts
interpreting national law and a supra-national court interpreting a
different supranational law.
Article 7 of the EPC provides that rights under the European
Patent and under national patent laws "may not be enjoyed simul-
taneously in so far as the invention originates from one and the
same inventor." Although dual protection of the same invention
is thus prohibited, the fact that a choice of two patents is available
to nationals of contracting states while only national patents are
available to Unionist foreigners creates an obvious discrimination
based on nationality-the exact effect which Article 2 of Paris Union
was intended to prevent. Furthermore, a nationality requirement
goes even further than a requirement of domicile or residence which
25. See Arts. 3, 15, 16, 55, 56, 94, 2 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP'. irir 5503, 5508, 5520,
5521, 5564, 5565, 5603.
26. Article 20, second variant, representing the minority position, defines infringe-
ment in terms of national patent provisions. 2 CCH Com. Mxcr. REP. II 5525.
27. Arts. 105, 113. 2 CCH COM. Micr. REP. 1111 5614, 5622.
28. See Johnston, The Draft European Patent Convention-A Commentary, 1 C.M.L.
REv. 17, 26 (1963).
29. Article 100, Treaty of Rome, 298 U.N.T.S. 54 provides: "The Council, acting
by means of a unanimous vote on a proposal of the Commission, shall issue directives
for the approximation of such legislative and administrative provisions of the Member




article 2 specifically prohibits. This view of article 2 represents the
German and American position on the legality of article 5, variant 2,
EPC, under the Paris Union Agreement. 30
The French position challenges these contentions on the grounds
that they have the effect of turning the national treatment provision
of article 2 into a most-favored-nation clause. National treatment,
they argue, means that Unionist states may claim for their nationals
only those benefits which the national laws of other Union States
grant to nationals of those states. Though the EPC may indeed confer
different substantive rights on nationals of its contracting states, these
rights are granted by treaty rather than by national law and, there-
fore, need not be granted to Unionist foreigners as well under article
2. The continued existence of the national laws emphasizes the
nature of the EPC as creating supranational extraterritorial rights
which "have no equivalence to national law."31 Although the French
argument deliberately ignores the discriminatory effect of the pro-
posed restrictive provisions in favor of emphasis on the technical
language of article 2, it provides a basis for the contention that the
EPC is an allowable special arrangement under article 15.
A note introducing the General Provisions of the EPC states that
the preamble to the Convention should indicate that the Convention
constitutes a special arrangement in the sense of article 15 of the Paris
Union agreement. An examination of three existing special arrange-
ments-The Madrid Arrangement for the International Registration of
Trademarks, 32 The Arrangement of the Hague for the International
Registration of Designs or Industrial Models,3 and The Madrid Ar-
30. See Frayne, The EEC Patent and the National Treatment Principle, 39 CAN.
PAT. REP. 69 (1963); Ladas, Common Market Patent and Trademark Treaties, Open or
Closed?, 51 TRADEMARK REP. 1203, 1207 (1961); Ulmer, supra note 24, at 60;
Weiser, supra note 22, at 321.
31. Colas, Would Non-Accessibility to the Benefits of the European Patent Convention
to Nationals of Third Party Countries be Contrary to Article 2 of the Paris Convention
of 1883, 1963 IND. PROP. 48; see Saint-Gal, Marques et March6 Commun 39 REVUE
Dv MAncni CoaNvruN 320, 325 (1961).
32. Original at Madrid, April 14, 1891; revised at Brussels, Dec. 14, 1900; at
Washington, June 2, 1911; at The Hague, Nov. 6, 1925; at London, June 2, 1934;
and at Nice, June 15, 1957. This arrangement originally provided that once a trade-
mark had been registered in the "home" country, a national of that country might use
it internationally and the mark would then be considered to have been applied for
in each of the contracting states without the necessity of actual application being
filed there. Each state retains the right to reject a mark under provisions of its own
national law. See Oc-RoomuREAu Los EN STICTER, MANUAL FOR THE HANDLING OF
APPLICATIONS FOR PATENTS, DESIGNS AND Ti ssmARKS THROUGHOUr THE WORLD,
General Part, International Design Registration [hereinafter cited as MANUAL].
33. Original at The Hague, Nov. 6, 1925; revised at London, June 2, 1934; at
The Hague, Nov. 28, 1960; with an additional arrangement at Monaco, Nov. 18,
1961. This agreement is similar to the Madrid Trademark Arrangement except that




rangement for the Suppression of False and Misleading Indications of
Origins34-discloses major functional differences between these agree-
ments and the EPC. Opponents of restricted availability contend that
these arrangements do not work inherent discrimination against non-
nationals of the contracting states. The arrangements on trademarks
and designs do not affect the national law of the signatory states
so as to discriminate against nonnationals, and the indications of
origins arrangement operates to give protection to all countries,
not merely to its own signatories. 5 Further, none of these arrange-
ments involves the degree of sacrifice of internal sovereignty that
is required of contracting states under the EPC. Any nation acceding
to an EPC containing variant 2 would lose some control over its own
patent system and would thus preclude itself from carrying out its
obligations under the Paris Convention. 6
A contrary view has been stated by the International AssQciation
for the Protection of Industrial Property on the grounds that requiring
accessibility under article 2 "would run the risk . . . of making
article 15 meaningless since it permits special arrangements to be
entered into."37 This reasoning begs the question.
Two other contentions which are quasi-legal in nature are made
by the proponents of the restrictive variant of article 5, EPC. Both
deal with the concept of reciprocity. The first is that the signers of
the EPC will grant better protection to each others' nationals through
the medium of the Convention only in return for the assumption of
specific reciprocal obligations. Therefore, no other state should be
allowed to benefit from this improved protection unless it too is
willing to assume obligations to grant similar improved protection.m
This contention fails in the light of the legislative history of the
Paris agreement. At the preliminary conference on the Paris Con-
vention in 1880, the following provision was suggested in place of the
present article 2: "The subjects and citizens of each of the con-
34. Original at Madrid, April 14, 1891; revised at Washington, June 2, 1911; at The
Hague, Nov. 6, 1925; at London, June 2, 1934; and at Lisbon, Oct. 31, 1958. The
Arrangement provides for the seizure or prohibition of importation of any product
bearing a false or misleading indication of origin, where the indicated origin is one
of the countries signing the Arrangement. See MANUAl, General Part, Indications of
Origin.
35. Professor Ulmer points out that although the Hague Arrangement for the
Protection of Designs as revised makes the international registration also valid in the
country of origin and that this applies only to nationals of states who are members
of the Arrangement, there is no incompatibility with the Paris Union Convention
because the international filing does not give rise to substantive rights more extensive
than those granted to nationals. See Ulmer, supra note 24, at 58.
36. See Buckman, Access to the European Patent System, 7 PTC J. REs. & ED. 427,
430 (1963).
37. Minutes, supra note 2, at 1.
38. See Colas, supra note 31, at 51; Frayne, supra note 30, at 79.
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tracting countries shall enjoy reciprocally, in all other countries of
the Union ... etc." After considerable discussion, the provision was
changed to eliminate the word "reciprocally" in order to avoid the
possible interpretation that the principle of reciprocity had been
made a part of that article.39
The second contention concerning reciprocity is that since the
contracting states will have ceded a portion of their sovereignty under
the EPC in return for certain benefits, it would be unfair to require
them to make the benefits gained under the Convention available
to other states who have not been willing to make this sacrifice.
40
Although this argument has a surface validity, it does not bear
analysis. While the non-contracting states would not sacrifice sov-
ereignty reciprocally with members of the EPC, the individual patent
applicant, by applying for an EPC patent, would of necessity submit
himself to the jurisdiction of the Convention machinery with only
those rights and duties which member states, through the Conven-
tion, had granted to or imposed upon their own nationals-no more,
no less.41 It is on this level that the Paris Union Convention seeks
to grant protection, not on the level of state-state relationships as
such.
Many of the legal complications under the Paris Union agree-
ment would be avoided if the proposed patent convention were
incorporated into the legal structure of the EEC. The supranational
nature of the Community sets it apart from other multilateral agree-
ments. The delegation of significant powers by the members of the
Community to the Community institutions makes it unique as an
international organization. It is more than a customs union but
less than a new political entity. Even though the creation of a
Common Market patent involves measures which are not consistent
39. The following quotation is taken from a semi-verbatim report of the proceedings:
"M. Herich, del6gu6 de la Hongrie et M. Veniers van der Loeff, del6gu6 des Pays-Bas,
ont demand6 la suppression du mot r6ciproquement, qui leur paraissait pouvoir donner
lieu .t un malentendu, en ce qu'l pouvait faire supposer h tort que les dispositions dc
l'article 2 reposaient sur 1' application non pas seulement du traitement national,
mais aussi du principe de ]a reciprocit6. Sans partager ces apprehensions, la Com-
mission considerant que ce mot n'est pas essential, a cru devoir donner satisfaction A
cette demande, en la suppriment." [M. Herich, the delegate from Hungary, and
M. Veniers van der Loeff, the delegate from the Netherlands, requested the removal
of the word 'reciprocally' which appeared to them to give rise to a misconstruction by
making it possible to suppose that the application of article 2 rested not only on
national treatment but also on the principle of reciprocity. Without sharing these
apprehensions, the Commission, considering that this word was not essential, was able
to satisfy this request by removing it. (translation by the author.)] Conference Inter-
nationale Pour la Protection de la Propri&t6 Industrielle, (Paris, 1880), j. 43. For
additional relevant discussion, see id., pp. 39-40.
40. See Arnengaud, supra note 13, at 318; Ladas, supra note 30, at 1205; Saint-Cal,
supra note 31, at 325.
41. See Ladas, supra note 30, at 1204; Ulmer, supra note 24, at 57.
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with specific provisions of the Paris agreement, the fact that the
Paris Union was originally promulgated and adopted prior to the
emergence of the EEC and that the present article 2 and article 15
do not contemplate the existence of a supranational entity with the
Community's singular aims and goals should militate against an
attempt to hold the EEC member states strictly to their Paris Union
obligations.4
This is not to say that discrimination against nonnationals or refusal
to abide by the Paris Union requirements would be justified if it
could not be shown that such action was necessary to accomplish
the purposes of an EEC patent. On the other hand, recognition of
what the Community is trying to do and of the necessity for doing
it should provide the basis for a recognition by other Paris Union
members that strict enforcement of their legal rights may be inap-
propriate in the present context. Such would not be the case were
the EPC intended to operate as an entity separate from, though
closely related to, the Community. Practical justifications for avoid-
ing Paris Union requirements are not as strong when one thinks in
terms of an "international" or European patent aimed only at creating
a more efficient operation for the benefit of several unrelated states.
IV. B]LATEmAL LEGAL RIGHTS
The legality of the restrictive approach to article 5, EPC, may
be questioned under bilateral international agreements as well. The
United States has commercial treaties with all six of the Community
countries.43 These treaties contain both national treatment and most-
favored-nation clauses. The Treaty of Rome apparently takes the
position that although the six member nations of the EEC may be
individually bound to other states on a most-favored-nation basis,
such provisions in bilateral treaties will not necessarily extend to third
countries the advantages accruing to each EEC member state under
42. Compare Jecies, Non-Accessibility of Proposed Common Market Patents of Third
Party Nationals and its Effect on U.S. Convention Rights, 9 IDEA 61, 71-72 (1965),
suggesting that United States courts refuse to recognize prior foreign patent filings in
member states of the EPC if availability of the new patent is restricted.
43. Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation with Luxembourg, Feb. 23,
1962 [1963] 14 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 251, T.I.A.S. No. 5306; Treaty of Friendship, Estab-
lishment and Navigation with Belgium, Feb. 21, 1961 [1963] 14 U.S.T. & O.I.A.
1284, T.I.A.S. No. 5432; Treaty of Establishment, Convention, with Protocol and Joint
Declaration with France, Nov. 25, 1959 [1960] 11 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2398, T.I.A.S.
No. 4625; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with The Netherlands,
March 27, 1956 [1957] 8 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942; Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation with Italy, Sept. 26, 1951 [1961] 12 U.S.T. & O.I.A.
131, T.I.A.S. No. 4685; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Italy,
Feb. 2, 1948, 63 Stat. 2255, T.I.A.S. No. 1965.
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the Rome Treaty.44 This position is based on the special nature
of the Rome Treaty and on the "integral part" which these mutually
ceded advantages play in the establishment of the Community.5
The United States has not objected to this unilateral denial of the
most-favored-nation provisions.
Four of these commercial treaties (those with France, the Nether-
lands, Germany and Belgium) accord national treatment regarding
patent rights to United States nationals.46 Although these clauses
would not necessarily extend the interstate benefits of the EPC to
third-party nationals,47 it appears that the national treatment pro-
visions would require the extension of any new internal right to
United States nationals as well.48 This argument parallels the one
raised by the proponents of free availability under article 2 of the
Paris Union with the important difference that in the trade treaties
there is no recognized exception like that in article 15 of the Paris
agreement.
49
The United States' treaty with Italy requires most-favored-nation
treatment where patent rights are concerned. 50 It has been suggested
44. Treaty of Rome, art. 234, 298 U.N.T.S. 91. Although paragraph (1) of article
234 provides that rights and obligations under prior international conventions to
which the EEC member states are parties shall not be affected, paragraph (2) calls
for a "common attitude" toward the elimination of any prior obligations incompatible
with the Rome Treaty and paragraph (3) provides: "Member States shall, in the
application of the conventions referred to in the first paragraph, take due account of
the fact that the advantages granted under this treaty by each Member State form an
integral part of the establishment of the Community and are therefore inseparably linked
with the creation of common institutions, the conferring of competences upon such
institutions and the granting of the same advantages by all other Member States."
45. See Hay, The European Common Market and the Most-Favored-Nation Clause,
23 U. Prrr. L. REv. 661, 676 (1962).
46. Belgium, art. V; France, art. VIII; Netherlands, art. X; Germany, art. X. The
Belgian clause, which is typical, reads: "Nationals and companies of either Contracting
Party shall be accorded, within the territories of the other Party, National treatment
with respect to obtaining and maintaining patents of invention, and with respect to
rights in trade marks, trade names, trade labels and industrial property of all kinds."
47. Cf. Ulmer, supra note 24, at 59-60.
48. See Hay, supra note 45, at 670.
49. This statement is not absolutely correct. An exchange of notes appended to
the Treaty with The Netherlands, supra note 43, provides: "The Netherlands should
continue to be able to participate in European regional arrangements which serve these
areas and the broad interests of both parties, even though the Netherlands may there-
after be obliged to grant some reciprocal advantages to other participating countries
which it is unable to grant to non-participating countries." In addition, article XXII(4)
of the Netherlands Treaty incorporates exceptions to most-favored-nation treatment
recognized under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [hereinafter cited as
GATTI. See text accompanying note 55 infra.
50. See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with Italy, Sept. 26, 1951
[1961] 12 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 131, T.I.A.S. No. 4685. "The nationals, corporations and
associations of either High Contracting Party shall enjoy, within the territories of the
other High Contracting Party, all rights and privileges of whatever nature in regard
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that this most-favored-nation clause could serve as a legal basis for
a demand by the United States government that United States
nationals be accorded all rights (other than those relating to trade
barriers)51 which Italy would grant to nationals of other contracting
states under the EPC.
52
Since the adoption of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
to which each of the Six and the United States are parties, an excep-
tion to most-favored-nation treatment has come into existence where
regional preference systems, customs unions and free trade areas
involving GATT members are concerned. 53
ARTICLE XXIV (8)(a), GATT, provides:
A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a
single customs territory54 for two or more customs territories, so that
(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce . . . are
eliminated between the constituent territories of the union or at least
with respect to substantially all the trade in products originating in
such territories, and,
(ii) ...substantially the same duties and other regulations of com-
merce are applied by each of the members of the union to the trade
of territories not included in the union ....
The "customs union exception" applies only to agreements relating
to actual interstate "trade barriers." It does not permit the raising
of trade barriers against other GATT members not parties to the
customs union or other regional arrangement.5 Where agreements
among customs union members are not related to the destruction of
internal trade barriers, an excellent argument has been made that
there is no legally supportable means by which most-favored-nation
treatment could be denied if it is specifically provided for in a bilateral
treaty to which one of the members of the customs union is a party.55
to patents. . . .upon compliance with the applicable laws and regulations respecting
registration and other formalities, upon terms no less favorable than are or may hereafter
be accorded to the nationals, corporations and associations of any third country."
51. Article XXIV, para. 3(b) of the Italian Treaty makes rights accorded a third
country "by virtue of a customs union" an exception to most-favored-nation treatment.
63 Stat. 2290, T.I.A.S. No. 4685.
52. Hay, supra note 45, at 669.
53. Art. XXIV, paras. 5(a), 8(a), 62 Stat. 2014, T.I.A.S. No. 1765 (effective March
24, 1948).
54. Art. XXIV, para. 2 defines a customs territory as "any territory with respect to
which separate tariffs or other regulations of commerce are maintained for a substantial
part of the trade of such territory with other territories." 62 Stat. 2013, T.I.A.S. No.
1765.
55. Art. XXIV, para. 4, 62 Stat. 2014, T.I.A.S. No. 1765.
56. Hay, supra note 45, at 676-84. Mr. Hay points out that the EEC has argued
for an implied extension of the customs union exception to areas other than those
involving trade barriers on the grounds that the EEC constitutes a new economic entity
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Although where the EEC is concerned this technical right to enforce
bilateral treaty provisions may give way in the face of the United
States' desire to encourage the growth of the Community, it is impor-
tant to note that these considerations may not carry such weight where
the question of availability of a general European patent or an "inter-
national" patent, not legally integrated with the EEC, is involved.
The proposed EPC contains no provision comparable to article
234, paragraphs (2) and (3), of the Rome Treaty.57 Article 8 of the
EPC provides only: "This Convention shall be without prejudice
to any commitments entered into by the Contracting States by
virtue of other international agreements." Furthermore, despite the
close relationship between the EEC and the EPC, the EPC as a
separate entity could hardly qualify under the customs union or
regional arrangements exceptions of GATT. The EPC provisions for
accession or association by other states in articles 211 and 212 take
it out of the GATT definition since such accession or association
is not contingent upon the removal of interstate trade barriers. The
purpose of the EPC, as presently drafted, is not aimed at lifting
trade barriers as such.
The Common Market, however, is a customs union as defined
by the GATT. Although barriers raised by national patent rights
are not technically trade barriers under the GATT definition, their
abolition within the EEC would perform much the same function as
the abolition of tariffs on intra-Community trade. The need for an
EEC patent law is directly related to the achievement of economic
integration and the valid distinction between national patent bound-
aries and tariff barriers in a non-Community context weakens con-
siderably when the functional interrelationship between national
patent rights and tariff barriers within the EEC is recognized. If
the EPC were incorporated into the Rome Treaty and made an
integral part of the general law of the Community, an excellent
argument could be made that the customs union exception to most-
favored-nation treatment should apply to the provisions of the new
patent law as well.
The national treatment provisions of the treaties create somewhat
more difficulty. One possible solution, if the new patent convention
were incorporated into the EEC Treaty, would be the renegotiation
and therefore must be treated as a unit. Thus, none of the inter sese advantages need
be extended under a bi-lateral most favored nation clause since this would play one
part of an "economic unit" off against the other. The author indicates, however, that
this argument lacks legal validity since the most favored nation principle is designed
to prevent discrimination in favor of other political entities and until the EEC attains
this status as a whole, the separate political entities which make up the economic
unit should remain bound by their treaty obligations.
57. See note 44 supra.
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of the bilateral treaties containing national treatment provisions
relating to patents to insert a specific exception for the new EEC
Patent. On the other hand, the rationale suggested in connection
with the national treatment provisions of the Paris Union agreement
would have equally valid application here without renegotiation
of the treaty provisions.
The special nature of the Rome Treaty and its role in creating
a supranational organization should be a valid reason for denying
general rights under the Community treaty to United States nationals
claimed by virtue of either most-favored-nation provisions or national
treatment clauses,5 8 but this reasoning cannot apply to the proposed
patent convention as long as it is not integrated into the Rome Treaty
as exclusively Common Market law.
The practical value of legal arguments based on treaty provisions
as a means of forcing admittance of United States nationals to the
benefits of the EPC is doubtful, even if the new convention were
treated as an agreement separate from the Rome Treaty. On the
other hand, the legal validity of the EPC under prior international
agreements has caused considerable concern to its drafters. In-
corporation of the EPC into the Rome Treaty should help resolve
some of these doubts and put the Six in a better position to agree
among themselves on the adoption of an EEC Patent, based on the
proposals of the Convention.
V. THE NFD FOR AN EEC PATENT
The most practical solution to the needs of the Common Market
is the creation of a Community patent with control and administration
resting in the executive and judicial branches of the EEC. The
proposed patent convention leans in that direction and, for the good
of the Community, considerations aimed at "internationalizing" patent
law should be of secondary importance to Community members. In
the same vein, the question of availability should be considered, not
in purely legalistic terms, but in the context of its value or detriment
to the development of the Community. The economic and political
interests of the United States, as well, lie in encouraging the develop-
ment of the EEC. The more intimate the economic bonds within
the EEC become, the less likely it will be that one nation could
take the risk of withdrawing or, perhaps, of even threatening with-
drawal, from the Community without serious damage to itself as
well as to its partners. Further positive steps toward economic
integration are especially important now in the light of the "compro-
mise solution" reached at the January meeting of the Council of
58. Compare Hay, supra note 45, at 678-82.
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Ministers which may have the effect of slowing the progress of
the Community by encouraging unilateral economic action by the
member states.59
Since the publication of the draft of the proposed Convention, there
has been considerable discussion concerning the possible effects on
the EEC of limiting or not limiting the availability of the new patent.
Since some of the contentions raised are specious and most have
already been adequately considered elsewhere, they will not be
treated here.
It is the purpose of the remainder of this article to demonstrate
the validity of two propositions: (1) That a common patent law
based on the aims and needs of the EEC is a necessary adjunct to
the goals of economic integration; and (2) that making the patent
freely available to nationals of non-EEC states, while a necessary
element in the achievement of those goals, need not be a stumbling
block to the initial adoption of a new Community patent system.
A. The Rules of Competition and the European Patent
The rules of competition of the EEC are set forth in articles 85
and 86 ol the Treaty of Rome. They are implemented by regulation
No. 17, issued by the Commission under the authority of article 87.
The rules presuppose that enterprises within the Community are
engaged in competition for a share of a "common" market.60 The
key factor in this presupposition is the existence of a market which
is truly "common" to the six member states. The rules of competi-
tion are designed not only to preserve competition between enter-
prises in such a market but to encourage the free flow of goods across
national boundaries by preventing restrictive agreements which would
divide the market into separate economic segments.
The lack of uniformity in the national patent laws tends to en-
courage, rather than discourage the division of the Common Market
into separate economic units by forcing prospective patentees and
licensees to think and act in terms of territorial borders rather than
in terms of a market common to all competing interests. Conse-
quently, where patented products are concerned, a distortion of
59. The Ministers agreed that in the case of decisions which may be taken by a
majority vote on a proposal of the Commission, if "very important interests" of ono
or more of the member states were at stake, an attempt would be made to reach a
decision unanimously. The Council noted, however, a "divergence of views" as to
whether such discussions must be continued until a unanimous decision had been
reached. 2 CCH Comm. Mxrr. REP. II 9084. See also note 7 supra.
60. See Kronstein, The Significance of Provisions Concerning Restraints of Competi.
tion Within the Total Perspective of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty
and the European Economic Community Treaty, in I CARTEL AND MONOPOLY IN
MoDERN LAw 132 (1961).
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trade within the Community occurs. Patented products cannot cross
national borders without reference to the rights granted by individual
states under their national patent laws. Under the present system
of national laws, protection throughout the Community cannot be
obtained unless the same product or process is patented in each of
the six member states. Whenever such multiple patenting occurs, the
patentee is given the power to divide the market for his product on
national lines because the operation of the doctrine of "exhaustion"
of patent rights is confined to the territory of the state which has
granted the patent in question.
The doctrine of "exhaustion" is based on the theoretical justifications
of the patent system itself. A patentee is granted a monopoly for a
limited time to allow him to gain a greater reward for his inventive
efforts than would be available if he were forced to compete with
other producers of articles embodying his inventive idea. The avail-
ability of such a preferred position is intended to encourage in-
ventive activity and thereby benefit society in general. It is pre-
sumed that when the patentee sells an article embodying his inventive
idea, he may charge whatever a purchaser is willing to pay for that
article without facing the rigors of competition-usually the offer of
the same product by a competitor at a lower price. The purchaser
may resell or use the patented article without restriction, though
he may not reproduce it. To do so would amount to a general use
of the inventive idea for which the patent was granted rather than
use of the specific article for which the patentee's "tribute" has been
paid. Once the patentee has sold a patented article he is presumed
to have reaped his reward-represented by a presumed increment
in the selling price attributable to his monopoly position-and may
therefore no longer exercise monopoly powers over that particular
article.
If a patentee holds a patent on the same invention under each
of the six national patent systems within the EEC, he possesses six
separate patent rights. Therefore, although sale of a patented article
"exhausts" his monopoly over that article in the state of the sale,
the patentee retains the right to prevent the importation or sale
of that same article in each of the other five states. Furthermore, since
he may license rights under each of his national patents separately,
he may grant to others the right to restrict the movement of that
particular article in the flow of commerce within the "common"
market. This is precisely the kind of trade restriction which the rules
for the regulation of competition are designed to prevent.





The rights attached to a European Patent shall not extend to acts
concerning a patented article covered by the said patent which are done
on the territory of Contracting States after the proprietor of the patent
has put that article on the market in one of these States.
In addition article 2 (2) provides that a patent "may only be
assigned or permitted to lapse in respect of the whole of this ter-
ritory [of the Contracting States]." Article 7 prohibits the simul-
taneous enjoyment of rights under the Convention Patent and under
national patent laws "in so far as the inventon originates from one
and the same inventor." These three articles, together, represent a
major step toward solving the problems created by the simultaneous
existence of national patent systems and supranational regulations
aimed at preserving interstate competition.
It has been suggested that some of these same benefits could be
obtained without the adoption of a Common Market Patent Law.
Dr. Norbert Koch and Dr. Franz Froschmaier, staff members of
the EEC Commission in the General Directorate for Competition,
suggested last year that the problems of parallel patenting and na-
tional patent boundaries limiting the operation of the doctrine of
exhaustion could be solved within the Community under the rules
for the protection of competition alone.61 Pointing out the "fictional
independence of parallel patents in the context of the field of
competition, 62 Koch and Froscbmaier advocated the use of "the
competitive concept of economic policy under the Rome Treaty" 63
to achieve two goals: First, that an attempt to prevent the export
of a patented article from a state in which it has been sold to another
state in which it still enjoys patent protection be treated no differently
under the Treaty competition rules than any other export pro-
hibition where patents are not involved;4 and, secondly, that the
61. Koch & Froschmaier, Patentgesetze and Territorialitiitsprinzip im Gem elnsamen
Markt, 1965 GRUR, ausl. Tefl 121, reprinted as The Doctrine of Territoriality in
Patent Law and the European Common Market, 9 IDF. 343 (1965) (English trans-
lation).
62. Id. at 126 ("die fiktive Unabhbiingigkeit paralleler Patente fUr den wettbewerbs-
relevanten Baum"), 356.
63. Id. at 125 ("die wettbewerbspolitischen Ordnungsvorstellungen des EWO-
Vertrags"), 354.
64. The EEC Commission has already indicated a willingness to disregard traditional
industrial property concepts in favor of unrestricted intra-Community competition. In
September 1964, the Commission ruled that a German manufacturer of electrical
appliances could not, by means of exclusive distributorship agreements, prevent the
export of its products from one member state to another by persons not parties to the
distributorship contract. This was true even though a special trademark (GINT) was
registered in the name of each exclusive distributor in the country in which he operated
and the products imported by third parties without the distributor's or the manufac-
turer's permission also carried the GINT mark.
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application of the competition rules be independent of the patent
legislation of each member state.65 To achieve this end, the writers
suggested that "exhaustion" of all parallel patent rights in a single
article take place whenever the protected article is introduced, by
the patentee or one authorized by him, into commerce in a state
in which it has patent protection.6
The Koch-Froschmaier approach admittedly does violence to the
traditional territorial theory of patents.67 But the entire structure
and operation of the EEC does violence to traditional theories on
every hand. The EEC is a "new animal." Its supranational character
and its successful future development require a fresh approach to
the solution of new problems. If it allows itself to be bound by tradi-
tion or by theories developed in a different context, it can never
achieve the degree of economic, social and, eventually, political
integration which its most avid supporters seek.
Adoption of the Koch-Froschmaier suggestion will not remedy
all of the difficulties which the proposed European Patent is designed
to cure. There would still remain the problem of varying provisions
and interpretations of national patent laws, the different examination
systems, and the multiplicity of patent offices, rules and regulations.
Therefore, it is in no sense a substitute for a true EEC patent. But
even under the new patent convention it is necessary that national
patent laws be retained to continue patent protection already granted
under them and to avoid the political difficulties inherent in an
immediate elimination of national patent systems. If the territorial
nature of patents is preserved under these laws, their operation
side-by-side with the new patent system would militate against the
achievement of the major goals which the new patent is designed
to accomplish-freeing the flow of intra-Community trade and elimi-
In summarizing its position, the Commission said: "Absolute territorial protection
appears as particularly noxious to the realization of the Common Market in making
more difficult or in preventing the alignment of the market conditions of the products
covered by the contract in the Common Market. . . . [Ilt appears expedient to
require Grundig and Consten to refrain from obstructing or impeding, by any means
whatsoever including the use to this end of the "GINT" trade mark, the parallel import
of Grundig products into France. This obligation does not prevent Consten from
exercising its rights over the "GINT" mark against third parties, in so far as it
does not act to obstruct or impede the parallel imports of Grundig products into the
contract territory." Re the Agreement of Grundig Verkaufs-GmbH [1964] C.M.L.R.
489, 504.
This case was viewed by many as a test of the Commission's power to apply the
principles of the Competition Rules to the exercise of industrial property rights within
the Community.
65. Koch and Froschmaier, supra note 61, at 124, 351.
66. Id. at 127, 358.
67. See, for example, the criticism of the Koch-Froshmaier suggestion in Monnet,




nating restrictions on intra-Community competition. Application of
the Koch-Froschmaier proposal to the remaining national patent
rights, therefore, appears essential to the success of the new European
patent in the context of the aims of the Community.
B. The Practical Effect of Free Availability
Despite the fact that the EEC can adopt a legal position which
would justify limiting the availability of the new patent to nationals
of its member states, such a limitation, imposed indefinitely, would
defeat the purpose of the new patent as a means of advancing eco-
nomic integration.
The most prevalent practical argument in favor of restricting the
availability of the proposed patent is that free availability would
permit the domination of the Community by nations which have
large research and development facilities, e.g., the United States,
resulting in "economic subjugation" of the EEC by outside interests.
This contention is of doubtful validity.
Patents are obtained by nonnationals in foreign countries for one
or more of three general purposes: To protect patented products
exported into the country where patent protection has been pro-
cured; to protect products to be manufactured in that country by a
branch or subsidiary; and to serve as the subject matter of a license
to a national of that country allowing him to make, use or sell the
product in return for royalties or for licenses on patents held by the
foreign licensee in the licensor's own country (cross-licensing or grant-
back).
Limiting the availability of the proposed patent would have little
effect on the operations of those foreign firms which actually have
"establishments" within the member states of the EPC.6 Where a
manufacturing subsidiary has been established, that subsidiary would
normally receive the status of a national under article 58 of the
Treaty of Rome.70 Thus, even under variant 2 of article 5, EPC,
an American company, having a subsidiary in the Common Market,
68. Armengaud, Political Aspects of Accessibility to the European Patent, 7 PTC J.
REs. & ED. 314, 317 (1963); Meller, Towards a Multinational Patent System, 44 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 227, 244 (1962); Weiser, Patent and Antitrust Developments and
Prospects of the European Economic Community, 8 PTC J. REs. & ED. 1, 8-9 (1964)
(quoting M. Andr6 Armengaud, Patent Attorney and Member of the French Senate);
Study Regarding International Cooperation in the Patents Field, 5 IND. PnoP. Q. 45-46
(1960).
69. Compare note 22 supra.
70. Treaty of Rome, art. 58, para. 1, 298 U.N.T.S. 40, provides: "Companies con-
stituted in accordance with the law of a Member State and having their registered office,
central management or main establishment within the Community shall, for the
purpose of applying the provisions of this Chapter, be assimilated to natural persons
being nationals of Member States."
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could protect its inventions through its "captive national" in an EEC
stateZ1 A branch operation, of course, would not receive this same
benefit.
Where an American firm exploits its foreign patents primarily by
licensing them to European companies, it is difficult to understand
how such activities could have an adverse effect on the economy of
the EEC since this practice makes available the products of American
research for local use. Limiting the availability of an EEC patent
would make it more difficult to license American-held patents within
the Community since any EEC firm would probably hestitate to
accept a license or a series of them under national patents unless
patent protection could be guaranteed throughout the entire area of
the Common Market.72 Smaller American companies which cannot
afford to set up their own operations within the Community would
be put at a special disadvantage.
The amount of foreign licensing activity engaged in by United
States companies is to a large extent still unknown. One survey of
186 larger United States firms included the following table showing
the extent of their foreign licensing activities :3
Per cent of Per cent of







From these figures it would appear that licensing is not a primary
motive of the larger companies for procuring foreign patent protec-
tion since only a little more than one-third of these companies license
more than fifty per cent of the patents they hold abroad. Eighty
per cent of the firms reporting indicated that obtaining protection
within a foreign market for their own products was their primary
objective in acquiring foreign patents.74 Many firms use licensing
only as a last resort when opportunities for exporting as a means of
71. See Armengaud, supra note 68, at 318: Ladas, supra note 30, at 1207; Robbins,
The Proposed New European Patent, 5 FTC J. REvs. & ED. 217, 232 (1962).
72. See Robbins, supra note 71, at 232.
73. Behrman, Licensing Abroad Under Patents, Trademarks, and Know-How by




expanding foreign markets seem to have irreparably declined. 5 It
is no doubt true that restricting the availability of the proposed
patent could have a drastic effect on United States export trade in
patented products with the EEC member states, particularly if it
were impossible to obtain national patent protection in all six states
to assure that a product would not be the target of wholesale copying
and sale in those states where it was not protected.
It seems, however, that the threat of domination of the EEC as
a whole by United States firms who export patented products is
negligible. American firms appear to acquire foreign patents in terms
of individual business policy rather than on a whole-sale "let's patent
in Europe" plan.7 6 The Berman Survey bears this out. Of those
companies having 1000 or more United States' patents, the number
of foreign patents held, excluding patents in Canada, ranged from
1% to 100% of the patents held domestically. The overall figure, based
on returns from ninety United States firms showed that only 28%
of the inventions patented in the United States were also the subject
of foreign patents held by those firms or their subsidiaries. 7 United
States nationals stood third (behind Great Britain and Germany)
in the percentage of domestic patented products also patented
abroad7 8 There is no indication that a significant change in this
pattern would occur if the European patent were made available to
nationals of non-EEC states.
It is conceivable that a combination of the common tariff wall and
the reduction of trade barriers within the Common Market could
lead to an increase in patenting there by foreigners, particularly with
the introduction of a true EEC patent. But these factors would also
tend to increase the use of patent licenses and direct investment,
both of which would be beneficial to the EEC economy. While fear
of American domination is strong in Europe, particularly among the
French,7 9 it appears to be generally recognized by the Europeans that
a continual flow of United States capital is necessary if the Com-
75. Behrman, Advantages and Disadvantages of Foreign Licensing, 2 PTC J. REs. &
ED. 137, 143 (1958).
76. For example, Westinghouse does most of its foreign business via licenses; General
Motors concentrates on direct investment; General Electric falls somewhere between
the two. Each approach would have different implications relevant to the number
of patents needed and the extent to which foreign patenting would be required. See
id. at 142.
77. See Behrman, New Data on Foreign Licensing, 3 PTC J. Rs. & ED. 357, 358
(1959). The author points out that "these averages are not 'representative' since they
are strongly affected by the policies of the few large companies included, %vhich patent
most of their inventions abroad."
78. Sanders, American Inventiveness v. Foreign Inventiveness, 5 PTC J. BRs. &
ED. 114 (1961).
79. See France Says Policies Reflect Determination Not to Become an Economic
Colony of U.S., Wall Street Journal, Feb. 24, 1966, p. 8, col. 2.
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munity is ever to develop industries of sufficient size and efficiency
to compete in the world market.80
The contention that individual member states might be dominated
by American investment at the outset before the Community has
achieved complete economic integration8' is refuted by the continuing
power of these states to control foreign investment within their
borders when such investment is made by non-EEC nationals, sub-
ject, of course, to the provisions of article 73. This argument
tends to reflect the desire on the part of some groups within
the Community to be treated as individual states when it suits
their purposes and to be considered as members of an economic
unit when that would be most beneficial. It is somewhat difficult to
determine whether the expression of these fears concerning "economic
subjugation" is meant seriously in all quarters or whether it merely
represents a desire on the part of the proponents of limited avail-
ability to establish a bargaining position to be discarded if other
concessions can be gained.82
Furthermore, limiting the availability of the new patent indefinitely
would serve to defeat one of the major aims of adopting an EEC
patent-the eventual disappearance of the national patent laws. If
the availability of the new patent is limited to nationals of EEC
states, nonnationals would be effectively forced to continue to seek
protection under the national patent systems, thus encouraging their
continued use by a substantial number of patentees. The second
paragraph of variant 2, article 5, would require the preservation of
national patent rights as an integral part of the new Convention.
In terms of the continued development of the Community, a
restrictive attitude toward foreign investment-and, thus, toward
foreign patentees-is hardly compatible with the general trade
policies, both internal and external, established by the Treaty of
Rome. In the words of Dr. Haertel, it is "unduly idealistic and
unrealistic" where industrial property is concerned.83 There is no
need to establish an economic Festung Europa.
On the other hand, the need for a true EEC patent should make
a compromise solution attractive to the Six as well as to the United
States if a reasonable alternative to total availability or total non-
availability can be found. In 1963 Dr. D. A. Was of the. Netherlands
suggested the creation of a patent of initially restricted availability
80. See Smith, Nationalism Threatens U.S. Investment, Fortune, Aug., 1965, pp.
126, 230.
81. See e.g., Armengaud, Political Aspects of Accessibility to the European Patent,
7 PTC J. RBs. & ED. 314, 317 (1963), stressing the fact that the EEC should not yet
be considered economically unified.
81. See Weiser, supra note 68, at 9, 10, 19.
83. Id. at 8.
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with full availability accruing after the new patent system had been
in operation for a sufficient length of time to observe its merits.' Dr.
Was's suggestion was based on technical and financial problems but
he recognized the political considerations involved as well. This
suggested compromise should be reexamined in the light of present
political realities. If substantial agreement can be obtained within the
Community on such a measure, it should be implemented.
Neither United States policy nor the policy of the states of the
Common Market should be based on legalisms or on nationalistic
considerations unrelated to practicalities. If the Community is to
grow, the problem of national industrial property rights must be
solved. The legal claims which the United States has under the
Paris Union Convention or under its bilateral treaties may be valid
ones, but the admonition of Raymond Vernon, former chief of the
State Department's International Business Practices Division, prior
to the Lisbon revision conference, is valid in the present context as
well.
The extraordinary character of the right sought through an international
patent should condition both what we demand in such a convention and
the insistence with which we demand it. Where we are convinced that a
mutual interest exists in having another nation grant exclusionary rights
to foreigners through patent grants, we should have no hesitation in trying
to persuade it to our point of view. But we must always recognize the
extraordinary nature of our demands, especially as seen through the eyes
of nations which view the domination of foreigners in their international
economic affairs as a real possibility.8
Representatives of the United States should encourage agreement
within the EEC on the question of industrial property, even if this
involves the sacrifice of short-term interests for the sake of long
range goals on both sides of the Atlantic. The legal and practical
considerations favoring "availability" of an EEC patent are strong
in terms of the interest of both the United States and the Common
Market. If the EEC would incorporate the proposed patent system
into the Treaty of Rome and guarantee a right of availability at a
specified later date, perhaps by an agreement at the 1968 revision
conference of the Paris Union Convention in Stockholm, the United
States should accept a limited availability for the time being.
This approach would accomplish three ends. It would assure
American nationals and nationals of all Paris Union countries that the
patent would become freely available at a fixed date. Secondly,
84. See generally Was, Access to the European Patent, 7 PTC J. REs. & ED. 7 (1963).
85. Vernon, The International Patent System and Foreign Policy, Publications of the
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Committee on the
Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 85th Cong. 1st Sess., No. 5, p. 34 (1957).
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confining the new patent to the EEC would provide assurance that
other nations could not join in the limitation of multilateral patent
protection merely by acceding to an "open-end" EPC. Full acces-
sion, or at least association, with the Community would be required
as well, a step which could not be undertaken lightly. Thirdly, if the
legal justification for allowing the limitation were couched in terms
of the special needs of the EEC, no precedent for future avoidance
of article 2 of Paris Union would be established unless those same
special needs could be shown, a condition not very likely to occur
within the immediately forseeable future, and then only in the context
of another "community" undertaking which it might well be to
American advantage to encourage.

